# Open Source – DRR R2

# 1ac – drr round two

## 1ac – harvard

### nuclear use advantage – 1ac

#### Advantage one is nuclear use.

#### U.S. first-use nuclear posture makes nuclear war structurally likely:

#### 1. CREDIBILITY DILEMMA. Nuclear first-use threats are not credible because of overwhelming U.S. conventional superiority. The U.S. attempts to make them credible through aggressive postures that ensure miscalculated war while eroding our conventional AND retaliatory deterrents.

Fetter and Wolfsthal 18

as Soviet nuclear capability grew credibility came into doubt. Would a president risk New York to save London The need to convince the Union and allies we would was driving the arms race It led to 7,000 t n w s It raised the very real possibility that should we fail to deter Europe would be destroyed the U S undertake risky policies to enhance credibility by limiting ability to control escalation There is no need to threaten to use nuc s to any conventional attack the threat is not necessary it is less than credible incredible threats weaken other commitments Abandoning incredible threats should make remaining use scenarios and therefore deterrence more credible. deterrence is not cost-free As in the Cold War actions to increase credibility of nuclear threats increas likelihood of nuclear war conventional defenses provide a more credible deterrent. The threat calls into question US conventional capabilities full confidence in those would eliminate need to threaten nuc s no-first-use security would be enhanced.

#### Consensus of experts agrees that the resulting nuclear posture raises escalation risks.

Cirincione 22

nonpartisan consensus grew among security elite senior strategists including military chiefs concluded country could be safer the 50s has returned The U S and Russia develop new nuc s This adds greater risks in Ukraine trends echo Cold War thinking emphasizing usable weapons integrated with conventional plans policy failures threaten destruction on a planetary scale We must return to policies that preserved deterrence reduced risk of nuclear war policies reduce the role of U.S. nuc s and avoid risky postures that trigger nuclear war by miscalculation Scores of scholarly studies refute warfare advocates the majority of independent experts believe U.S. objectives can be met with a safer posture A president can declare on their authority it will be policy of the U S never to initiate nuclear war risk of conflict between the U S Russia and China, is dangerously high Tensions over Ukraine or Taiwan get out of hand quickly Declaratory policy can be powerful in reducing risks 700 scientists wrote in favor

#### 2. COMMITMENT TRAPS. If and when deterrence fails, reputational costs will force the U.S. to use nukes first.

Fetter and Wolfsthal 18

veiled threats have lasting consequences US officials apparently believe repeatedly stating willingness to use can be reassuring announcing all options are on the table Anything interpreted as a direct commitment create a commitment trap the U S feel compelled to follow through with nuclear response even if they believe it might trigger catastrophic avoidable response failing could expose commitments as a bluff and question credibility of the U S on all security

#### 3. WARFIGHTING. Crisis dynamics and nuclear planners pressure the President to use nukes amid a conventional conflict. Once the nuclear threshold is crossed, escalation management becomes impossible, ensuring all-out war.

Blair 20

US posture always programmed first-use options including preemptive strikes Smaller-scale “limited options “low”-yield weapons for use early The role of nuc s countering non-nuclear threats steadily expanded after the Cold War cyber attack N P R does not rule out nuclear response. History shows repeatedly intelligence is often very wrong first use would trigger catastrophic escalation nuclear command is woefully inadequate for controlling escalation inadequacy goes beyond infrastructure to human dimension Presidents do not grasp consequences launch protocol consultations are “quick and dirty Cold War, strike that purportedly avoided cities would have all Soviet cities obliterated leaders lack knowledge about adversaries’ mind-set, resolve aims, and plans US escalation dominance was completely out of sync with Soviet strategy escalation to full-scale war was inevitable After decades it is still not known what leaders were thinking during Cold War crises it would be foolhardy to presume we know Putin’s, Xi’s Kim’s minds To stabilize crisis what is needed is predictability and reassurance first use is not on the table. action-reaction spiral spins out of control if even a single nuc were used both sides move rapidly to maximum war presidential decision making the contingency could easily caus mental duress a rattled president could order leaders may waver First use runs an existential risk to the world the US government should terminate the contingency

### plan – 1ac

#### The United States should adopt an operational nuclear no-first-use policy.

### HSWs advantage – 1ac

#### Advantage two is hypersonic weapons, or HSWs.

#### Global hypersonic weapons development is ramping up. The U.S. is lagging because it hasn’t fully committed to a plan to deploy the technology despite funding and development.

Weinberger 23

hypersonic weapon China and Russia have them ready The U.S. doesn't. the U.S invested billions efforts have been canceled Washington is pouring resources into hypersonics Moscow developed weapons that can threaten NATO Avangard can reach the U.S. the most advanced U.S. warship in the S C S could be defenseless Beijing could strike Guam Beijing has hypersonic s in its arsenal, as does Moscow Pentagon officials are debating how to respond to buildup Kremer said hypersonic s would be a "niche capability The challenge may be for the Pentagon to decide what hypersonic s it wants there is no clear plan for which to field and how

#### U.S. overcaution is driven by warhead ambiguity. Hypersonic weapons can carry either conventional or nuclear payloads. The resulting fear that adversaries will overreact to U.S. conventional deployments drives Congressional and DoD foot-dragging on hypersonic development.

Nanda 22

US Going Slow In Hypersonic Tech the DOD has not established any programs of record for hypersonic s it may not approve mission requirements or long-term funding how will Congress respond C R S says the principal query of Congress could be mission requirements Congress may be worried over strategic stability unintended escalation could occur as result of warhead ambiguity inability to distinguish a conventional hypersonic and a nuclear one such concerns previously led Congress to restrict funding for many weapon programs

#### Warhead ambiguity is the key issue for the future of the program.

Acton 13

congressional debate about Conventional P G S focused on above all warhead ambiguity both sides to stress the issue The ambiguity tail is wagging the dog of larger CPGS debate If Congress is asked to fund CPGS warhead ambiguity will become the central issue This was the reason for Congress’s refusal to fund the CTM Congress will only fund acquisition of CPGS if it can be persuaded risks of warhead ambiguity can be mitigated

#### No-first-use credibly eliminates the warhead ambiguity problem:

#### 1. OPERATIONAL CHANGES. They render the firebreak between nuclear and conventional weapons absolute AND spur global follow-on.

Tannenwald 18

New technologies blur nuclear and conventional weapons U.S. leaders consistently recognized this firebreak efforts to develop conventional weapons may increase risk of nuclear use hypersonic development for example without new understandings about what make deterrence stable new tech may increase risk cornerstone of restraint would be declared n f u policy operational n f u would eliminate first-strike postures capabilities and destabilizing warfighting strategies induce restraint in targeting l o w alert levels procurement and modernization it would shape physical qualities of nuc s removal of threats would strengthen strategic stability It would make absolute the boundary between nuclear and conventional weapons U.S. n f u would create political space for Russia to follow would also anchor existing policies of China and India and acknowledge their leadership

#### Those changes are visible and self-reinforcing.

Vadillo 16

NFU leads to practical visible shaping of nuclear posture and procurement structure of Chinese forces is consistent the country possesses a small number of ICBMs and keeps warheads in separate storage it lacks early-warning system and TNWs unlikely NFU agreements might become self-enforced If transparent practice of a state leads to a parallel NFU defection provoke defection reducing security for all. defector is unlikely to achieve surprise changes from NFU would be noticed LOW would require an early-warning system which is difficult to hide

#### 2. AUDIENCE COSTS. High cost of reversal makes the plan look credible across administrations.

Sanger and Broad 16

n f u the next president could reject it But n f u would be hard to undo Military experts say the next president would hesitate to reverse such a decision since reversal would confuse allies and fray coalitions

#### 3. CONVENTIONAL ADVANTAGE. It historically generates trust in NFU declarations.

Tannenwald 19

n f u India and China attempted to make credible empirical record suggests a state’s choice tends to be strongly influenced by conventional balance nuclear states that possess conventional superiority are more likely to declare NFU because it privileges their conventional advantage This explain why Russia dropped its NFU The U S possesses overwhelming conventional superiority America’s first-use is unnecessary

#### That unlocks an aggressive shift to U.S. development and deployment of hypersonic weapons.

Russell 21

Parallel to NFU is HSWs These highly maneuverable systems traverse unpredictable flight paths at speeds greater than Mach 5 With no system capable of intercepting these provide the U S ability to hold targets thousands of miles away and execute devastating attack within minutes Can non-nuclear HSWs allow the U S to declare NFU If nuclear use is limited how would deterrence adapt? the 2010 NPR states “[a]s the role of nuc s is reduced non-nuclear elements take on a greater share of deterrence burden the NPR is not an outlier commander of STRATCOM testified by replacing nuclear with conventional weapons in the U.S. war plan the U S reduce reliance on, nuc s non-nuclear deterrence continues to be seriously contemplated at highest levels of government The idea has been considered seriously by multiple administrations over decades

#### Nuclear first-use is inherently non-credible. Next-generation conventional HSWs provide more credible and capable deterrence AND assurance because they are more usable and accurate.

Russell 21

advent of U.S. conventional preeminence fostered a environment in which the role of nuc s in deterring declined significantly China continued to improve forces Russia carried out serious offensives Even so, U.S. dominance cannot be discounted credibility of first-use threat remains questionable there is no plausible scenario nuc s would be expected or needed to retaliate the threat cannot be a credible deterrent HSWs altitudes makes it 20 times harder to detect conventional HSWs have energy to get through hardened targets missiles could deliver payloads more precisely they may not need explosive yield of a nuc there would be no nuclear fallout intent to use a conventional system would be viewed as more credible than a nuc the U S could retain a robust deterrent while declaring NFU assurances run the risk of appearing a hollow bluff non-nuclear forces could close this credibility gap non-nuclear HSWs could serve as a more credible meaningful extended deterrent HSWs provid excellent capability sheer speed provides ability to hold distant time-critical defended targets at risk These could be deployed anywhere from land, sea, or air The U S could assure allies this versatile system flying five miles per second would destroy targets in seconds

#### NFU captures the upsides of hypersonic weapons while eliminating their downsides.

Russell 21

HSWs come with concerns over stability If an adversary detects potential nuclear strike Is it possible for the U S to dispel such notions any deployments would be underpinned by nuclear NFU reducing chances of nuclear use this major step could not be discounted The U S might offer transparency measures at launch locations indicating a launch is non-nuclear widespread hypersonic deployment is inevitable the U S may be facing a limited window to declare NFU

#### Hypersonics are key to defeat adversarial A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) strategies – specifically, China’s in the SCS and Taiwan.

Kramer 23

hypersonic s Long range and high speed are desirable China have advanced air defenses long-range missiles and antiship missiles Chinese forces could establish large areas in which U.S. forces would be vulnerable Such antiaccess, area-denial would reduce U.S. power and give an adversary freedom of action Long-range weapons with high speeds could be launched from areas of lower risk but not take too much time to targets Disputes over the S C S occurred China threaten to take Taiwan by force China has A2/AD weapons that could limit U.S. naval and air access Chinese missiles have range of 1,500 km bombers could reach 3,500 km offshore China air defenses could engage naval aircraft China’s ability to intercept very fast, missiles en route to targets is limited for the future Hypersonic s could thwart A2/AD defenses

#### Failure to counter A2/AD provides a shield for Chinese territorial aggression in Taiwan and the SCS. That causes U.S.-China nuclear war.

Flournoy 21

Biden inherited a military at an inflection point current plans would leave the military unable to deter and defeat Chinese aggression the military must make technological investments to secure its edge actions in the next four years will determine the next four decades. greater challenges was driven by China’s new capabilities the Chinese military developed asymmetric approaches to undermine U.S. strengths including robust A2/AD These disrupt and destroy U.S. c and c U.S. forces will be at growing disadvantage If Beijing believes it could thwart U.S. response, it might use force against Taiwan or seize additional territories in the S C S a crisis could quickly escalate into conflict between nuclear powers Hence the imperative ensuring Chinese action would unsuccessful given Beijing’s assumption the U S is in decline Chinese leaders become increasingly aggressive risk of miscalculation and conflict will rise sharply

#### AND, the plan shores up global norms that resolve warhead ambiguity. Otherwise, miscalculated nuclear war from high-alert postures and AI integration causing flash wars.

Bugos 23

New tech threaten stability by increasing pace of conflict, increasing uncertainty reducing the human role but could also benefit strategic stability With less time to make a decision during high-pressure crunch decision-makers act rashly out of panic time can shrink due to unique flight profile of hypersonic s at high speeds miscalculation give way to nuclear escalation. This might prompt countries to rely on AI systems to analyze info , and recommend action a country receiving hypersonic s might question whether incoming weapons carry nuclear or conventional payload AI systems overwhelmed military decision-makers shift responsibility AI capabilities may execut response Relocating decision-making could prompt conflict to spin out of control as LAWS move quickly up escalation ladder with no oversight this flash war misinterpret data and trigger nuclear responses risk reduction measures enhance transparency of new tech and intentions behind use to guard against misperceptions prevent worst-case assumptions, Unilateral declarations enhance stability and transparency unilateral declaration have a cascading effect, other countries follow suit This occurred in space The U S commitment not to conduct ASAT testing seven additional countries committed the U N call on all countries to commit not to ASAT test with 150 countries in favor effective measures includes those that adjust nuclear declaratory policy elimination of l o w allow more time to assess incoming attack reconfiguring nuclear forces mitigate risks early

#### Successful Taiwan invasion ignites global hotspots and causes arms racing – extinction.

Easton 23

seizing Taiwan would break the alliance system and U N Nuclear arms racing would spiral out of control likelihood of World War Three climb higher Japan could go nuclear and become heavily militarized South Korea would build independent deterrent force Philippines Indonesia Malaysia would conclude they had no choice North Korea would takeover peninsula unprecedented coercion would escalate to war India would expand nuclear and conventional military PLA would re-tak territories Australia will fear being encircled develop nuclear armaments Chinese influence might fracture NATO alliance geoeconomics in a downward spiral, fragile gov s could topple Europe might be overtaken by populist impulses CCP would transform the world order.

# 2ac – harvard

## nukes advantage

## hypersonics advantage

## nuclearism K

### nuclearism K – 2ac

#### No ecology impact – nukes are not key, rest of the MIC and other countries thump AND climate is past tipping points. BUT, no impact.

Shellenberger 19

Environmental advocates made apocalyptic predictions Journalists have an obligation to describe problems honestly the catastrophist framing is self-defeating exaggerating risks distracting us from issues we have more control over. , no credible body said climate change threatens extinction IPCC reports see no reference to billions going to die, limited evidence that climate change or sea-level rise is the cause climate change is outweighed by other factors low socioeconomic development and capabilities economic development made us less vulnerable 99.7% decline in the death toll from natural disasters

#### Deterrence is good. It staves off nuclear Taiwan conflict. Subaltern anti-nuclearism forecloses hypersonic shift.

Ritchie 22

Hegemonic anti-nuclearism contest nuc s on the same ontological terrain within similar understandings about the state war order and power discourse reproduces security-through-strategic weapons based on that denuclearisation involve substitution of nuc s with conventional global strike system hegemonic nuclearism has been actively resisted by subaltern anti-nuclearism’ a different ontology’

#### Disarm is impossible BUT causes conventional war and reproliferation crises.

Ulgen 15

Complete disarmament is dangerous it is difficult to identify a alternative to nuclear deterrence deterrence worked m a d provide, a sound basis for limiting confrontations Devoid of nuclear deterrent nations experience fewer inhibitions against conflict conventional arms races would be unstoppable peace cartel would be very fragile Economic theory indicates breaking commitments by developing nuclear deterrent would have enormous benefits nothing short of attack to destroy the country would change the calculus , a single noncompliance would cause cascade of proliferation difficulty of transition States developed deterrents for reasons chief has been threat perception Until threats are permanently eliminated it is difficult to envision disarm If every state adopted n f u policy risk of nuclear war would be greatly reduced.

### conditionality – 2ac

## court curbing CP

### court curbing CP – 2ac

#### Do both. Court enjoins the President, who follows on. That is the only way to ensure compliance. Else, Biden says no.

Perkovich 13

domestic dynamics of the U.S. pose a obstacle to proposed policy Adopting is a career one for a president Proponents of new nuclear systems will mobilize resistance contractors lab s Proposing a change portrayed as weakening power invites ostracism

#### Do the counterplan. Counterplans must compete off germane net benefits with links to the plan. Alternative models shift the debate from core assurance and deterrence debates to “process” and “ban” slop that does not say the AFF is bad.

Thapar 14

in the absence of legislative decree courts may adopt policy

#### It’s institutionally incapable of overseeing injunction.

Damrosch 86

the Court could not supervise negotiations for mutual reductions The responsibility is with Congress No judicial declaration can make nuc s disappear statutory rule-making make Congress effective in restraining arms

#### Foreign policy certainty demands political stability. SOP fight derails perception of the plan which worsens crisis stability.

Ikenberry ’15

critical in stabilizing i r in a world of radical power disparities is character of America The outside world can see policymaking at work reach of heg has been driven by efforts to render power predictable mature institutions made it predictable The regularized way policy is made reduces surprises s o p create a system that reduces aggressive moves messiness can confuse foreign observers

#### Chain of command supercedes.

Blake 17

Defense secretaries are military generals who are accustomed to a chain of command. Would they ignore a court order in favor of Trump? rhetoric about authority suggest it's not out of the question

#### 4. Admin state is borked and Congress not solve

Beauchamp ‘20 [Z. Senior Correspondent at Vox, former Editor at Think Progress, holds an M.Sc. in International Relations from the London School of Economics, 2020. “Portland, polarization, and the crisis of the Republican Party,” Vox, July 24th, Available Online at <https://www.vox.com/2020/7/24/21335887/portland-trump-dhs-federal-polarization>]

in extremely polarized environment, Congress pushed to align with president of party than with institution. Republican senators act like partisans first Congress second; primary voters punish deviation from president Trump immune to congressional oversight no risk of congressional blowback Republican Party abdicating responsibility causes of crisis are profound and structural fused deepest polarization with Trump’s authoritarian instincts. president activate grievance politics that propelled Republican Party it clears the way for authoritarian rule the brakes are off

## chadha CP

### chadha CP – 2ac

#### Do both. The counterplan’s precedent controls.

Ides 86

to ban first use Congress could pass legislation a ban. The committee would exercise a plainly legislative function in rescinding a ban

#### No spillover. The CP is not a legislative veto.

Banks 86

legislative veto has three elements statutory delegation of power exercise of that power power to nullify that authority proposal contains an initial prohibition so long as no nuc s have been used by others the President shall not use the D.C. Circuit recognized a distinction between delegation followed by a veto and an initial prohibition congressional participation in first-use should not be characterized as a legislative veto

#### BUT, even overruling *Chadha* is insufficient.

Canaparo & Larkin 23

Supreme Court need not overrule Chadha Because of the pendulum where the President’s party likes emergency s and the party out of power does not, Congress exercise procedural oversight only when controlled by the opposite party. That reinforces emergency declarations Congress is very rarely successful at binding future Congresses to oversight overruling Chadha would not rein in emergency powers

### AT: DEWs – 2ac

#### Adversaries say no and don’t trust it. They view U.S. missile defense as a pretext for nuclear first-strike, causing war.

Tannenwald 19

The U.S arsenal, along with missile defenses and precision-strike lead leaders in Russia and China to believe the U S is capable of disarming first strike Russian or Chinese leaders might believe the U S might attempt a disarming strike forcing them to act preemptively

#### They’re unreliable.

Judson 23

Reliability decades of development biggest challenge ensuring sustainability in the field difficult to keep weapon up and running Lasers complicated to build a laser, many components not going to have a supply room maintenance office full of repair parts

#### They fail despite funding.

Gault 23

three problems tech limit s battlefield use, and ethical and health concerns tech isn’t mature Pentagon is having trouble finding contractors HEL and HPM are hard to power laser weapons lose effectiveness in fog or rain rules of engagement aren’t clear no one is sure what long term effects would be on people

## assurance DA

### east asia DA – 2ac

#### Shift to a credible non-nuclear deterrent unlocks U.S. nonprolif pressure in East Asia.

Russell 21

adopting NFU improve allies’ standing in NPT fora and their civil societies known for opposition By offering alternative deterrence to allies, the U S could bolster arguments for non-nuclear option pointing to moral credibility allies could gain with constituencies and the U N

#### BUT, sustained nuclear salience causes prolif.

Sukin & Dalton 21

Proponents of nuclear salience argue nuc s would assure about cred and prevent their own arsenals threats require assurance Yet nuclear might worsen the problem after Trump So Ko and Japan perceive the “end of US deep engagement Both initiated procurement countries will acquire nuc s of their own. So Ko polls show majority support extended nuclear deterrence may not address allies’ specific concern Allies also want reassurance the U S will not rashly use capabilities entangling its ally efforts to deterrence credible can increase acquisition of nuc s states worry they will be dragged in US over-valuing nuclear can spur beliefs that nuc s are necessary

#### Failure to counter China A2/AD collapses East Asian assurance.

O’Rourke 23

The SCS, ECS border Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Taiwan and emerging partner s Chinese A2/AD keep US. forces outside the first island chain Chinese control of near-seas region could help China project influence in the Western Pacific Chinese control complicate ability of the U S to intervene in crisis fulfill obligations under treaties with Japan the Philippines and South Korea; operate forces reduced U.S. ability encourage countries to reexamine defense programs China is trying to use the SCS and ECS to raise doubts among U.S. allies about the U S as ally drive a wedge between the U S and allies to weaken the security architecture

## cmr DA

### cmr DA – 2ac

#### CMR is eroding because of lack of civilian control over military decision-making

Vindman 24

c m r are badly frayed their deterioration undermine military effectiveness This should be deeply concerning fundamental contributors the need for a balance between military and civilian leadership Civilian control allows for accountable civilian authority to have the final say This is rooted in the Constitution civilian control has degraded Lawmakers need to reclaim their place Restoring stronger and more balanced relations necessitates civilian leadership

#### CMR hosed now.

Schmidt 23

Effective civilian control of the military is a fanciful myth c m r under extreme strain primary causes: a shrinking pool of effective civilian leaders increasingly politicized military exceptional influence of military elites on policy process. relations strained because of recent policy decisions related to Afghanistan, pandemic-induced turmoil debate over 2020 election

# 1ar

## K

#### Empirics prove nuclear deterrence prevents escalation of conflict AND Cold War history does not apply to today’s reduced arsenals.

Olsen 11.

finding from case studies deterrence can be achieved nuclear weapons ―produce patterns war-avoidance states strain at the leash but draw back by prospect of mass annihilation India and Pakistan troops were mobilized but strict orders were given to not breach border. threat, , of conflict escalating was enough to limit intensity Cold War standards can be discarded McNamara’s assured destruction options many times larger than necessary effective deterrence has minimal requirements. Unlike Cold W number of weapons is not directly correlated to numbers of weapons

#### Return of conventional war collapses infrastructure to solve other existential risks. This is justified by new 2NC cards and explanation of the alt as global fiated disarmament.

Kallenborn 24

nuclear weapons are not the only threat An asteroid bio weapons, volcanoes climate change nanotech and artificial superintelligence generate existential harm humanity needs global cooperation to align policies, pool resources maintain critical supply chains, build tech and prevent harmful tech Nuclear deterrence helps make that happen. governments aiming to reduce existential risks should support nuclear risk-reduction but oppose abolition abolition creates serious risk of return to great power conflict, which drastically increase existential risk. A global war risks survival of the global cooperative system necessary to combat existential threats while threatening infrastructure necessary for mitigation Protracted great power wars effects spilli across regions siphoning personnel, and resources If great powers collapse the global system may collapse Nuclear deterrence prevent that

### AT countervalue shift DA

#### Won’t counterforce now – ONLY plan solves

**Gerson 10**

any nuclear risks significant collateral damage from fallout even less populous areas could still cause casualties in unfavorable winds Given the U.S. desire to avoid civilian casualties adversaries increase disincentives such as purposefully locating in highly populated areas